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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I . NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a breach of contract and judicial foreclosure case. 
The Appellant ALBAR, INC., an Idaho corporation (herein "ALBAR") 
is a Defendant on the claims in Bonner County Case CV-2007-1489 
for breach of contract and is the Plaintiff on the claims in 
Bonner County Case CV-2007-1841 for judicial foreclosure of a note 
and deed of trust. The Appellant ALBAR appeals against the 
Respondents ECHO VANDERWAL and JLZ ENTERPRISES, INC., an Ohio 
corporation registered in Idaho (herein "JLZ") , and JAMES O. 
STEAMBARGE, a single man, from the Judgment And Decree Of Sale, 
entered in the above entitled action on July 27, 2010, and from 
the Order Disallowing Attorney's Fees And Costs entered in the 
above entitled action on November 5, 2010, and from the 
Memorandum Decision and Order re: Albar's Motion For Relief From 
Judgment, entered in the above entitled action on September 30, 
2011, the Honorable Steve Verby, District Judge, presiding. 
II. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On or about August 31, 2007, ECHO VANDERWAL and JLZ 
ENTERPRISES, INC., an Ohio corporation registered in Idaho 
(herein "JLZ") as the buyer of real property commenced an action 
against ALBAR as the seller of the real property and others 
involved in the real estate transaction. The action included 
several claims based upon the real estate transaction and 
subsequent cleanup efforts for the Idaho Department of 
Environmental Quality regulated petroleum leak site, on the 
property, which is known gas the Dock-N-Shop in Priest River, 
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Idaho. R. Pgs. 12-25. 
On or about November 2, 2007, ALBAR commenced an action 
against JLZ ENTERPRISES, INC. and JAMES O. STEAMBARGE for 
judicial foreclosure and for priority adjudication of its 
Seller's note and deed of trust, secured by the Dock-N-Shop 
property. R. Pgs. 246-251. 
On or about November 26, 2008, the actions were 
consolidated. R. Pgs. 57-59. 
The claims by JLZ against MARITA STEWART dba LAKE COUNTRY 
REAL ESTATE were dismissed prior to trial. R. Pgs. 87-90. JLZ 
and ALBAR entered certain stipulations involving the respective 
claims and admitting certain matters, which resulted in a 
resolution of all claims except for JLZ's causes of action for 
breach of contract and mutual mistake, and for offset damages, if 
any, against the sums due by JLZ to ALBAR on the judicial 
foreclosure. R. Pgs. 103-122. 
Commencing on or about June 22, 2009 and proceeding through 
June 25, 2009, the matter came for trial. Closing arguments were 
made on June 30, 2009. The Court announced its decision on the 
record in open sessions on July 2, 2009 and September 3, 2009. 
A motion for reconsideration by JLZ was heard on January 6, 
2010 and the Court entered its Order Re: Plaintiffs' Motion For 
Reconsideration And For Clarification on or about May 11, 2010. 
R. Pgs. 167-180. Alternative forms of judgment were presented 
for entry and briefing upon interest was ordered. R. Pgs. 181-
195. 
On July 27, 2010, the Court entered its Order on Proposed 
Judgments and its Judgment and Decree Of Sale. R. Pgs. 200-207. 
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ALBAR sought an award of attorney fees and costs. R. Pgs. 
208-229. The request was denied. 
ALBAR timely filed its Notice of Appeal and Amended Notice 
of Appeal, respectively. R. Pgs. 230-239. 
While the appeal was pending, on or about November 30, 2010, 
ALBAR filed its Motion For Relief From Judgment. Supp. R. Motion 
Filed November 30, 2010. The matter came for hearing on June 8, 
2011 followed by briefing. Supp. R. Briefs and Memoranda Filed 
July 22, 2011 and August 3, 2011. On or about September 30, 
2011, the Court entered it's Memorandum Decision And Order re: 
Albar's Motion For Relief From Judgment denying the relief 
sought. Supp. R. Memorandum Decision Filed September 30, 2011. 
ALBAR timely filed its Second Amended Notice Of Appeal. 
III. CONCISE STATEMENT OF FACTS 
ALBAR owned and operated a commercial convenience store, fuel 
sales, and marina business known as the Dock-N-Shop upon 2 parcels 
of real property located in Priest River, Idaho, upon the Pend 
Oreille River. On Memorial Day Weekend in May 2003, a petroleum 
fuel tank leak or release occurred from an underground storage 
tank ("UST") on the real property. ALBAR'S three (3) petroleum 
underground storage tanks and fuel system met all applicable 
regulatory provisions and ALBAR was insured through the State of 
Idaho Petroleum Storage Tank Fund ("PSTF") at the time of the fuel 
release in 2003. 
Immediately following the fuel release, personnel from ALBAR, 
the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality ("IDEQ"), the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), the Idaho Petroleum 
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Storage Tank Fund ("PSTF"), Kleinfelder, an environmental 
engineering firm, and certain subcontractor equipment operators 
met on scene and began immediate containment efforts, including 
the construction of wall and barrier to prevent the release of 
petroleum from traveling into the waters of the United States, 
specifically the Pend Oreille River. 
Immediately following and as part of the containment efforts, 
soils were removed and disposed at an approved facility. Over the 
next several months monitoring and remediation systems were 
installed to address soil contamination and groundwater 
contamination and a Consent Order was entered into in the late 
summer 2003 between ALBAR through its insurer the Idaho Petroleum 
Storage Tank Fund, and the Fund's contractor Kleinfelder, and the 
IDEQ (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4). The remediation project covered the 
Dock-N-Shop property, as well as immediately adjacent real 
property. 
Prior to and at the time of the release, the Dock-n-Shop 
business and real property were zoned commercial, with a 
commercial venture being operated on the property. Commercial 
Soil and Groundwater remediation clean up levels were established 
by the IDEQ and Kleinfelder with specific Site Specific Target 
Levels (SSTLs) based upon Idaho RBCA Guidelines. The remediation 
project continued. 
In 2005, JLZ ENTERPRISES, INC. ("JLZ"), operated by ECHO 
VANDERWAL purchased three contiguous parcels adjoining the Dock-N-
Shop parcel to the west, which included a portion of a parcel that 
had been impacted by the fuel leak. (See Plaintiffs Exhibit 6) . 
After closing on the three parcels to the East of the Dock-n-
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Shop, on June 14, 2005, ECHO T. VANDERWAL/JLZ ENTERPRISES, INC. 
AND/OR ASSIGNS submitted an offer to ALBAR for the purchase of the 
Dock-n-Shop business and property by an RE-23 Commercial/ 
Investment Real Estate Purchase And Sale Agreement with RE-17 
Financing Addendum #1 and RE-11 Addendum/Amendment #2 attached 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2). The offer was signed Echo VanderWal, 
with the signature physically placed upon the documents by Marita 
Stewart. At the time of the offer Echo VanderWal was residing in 
and physically located in Ohio. 
On June 16, 2005, by RE-13 Counter Offer #1 (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 2), ALBAR countered, which was accepted on June 16,2005 
signed Echo VanderWal with the signature physically placed upon 
the document by Marita Stewart. At the time of the counter-offer 
and the acceptance Echo VanderWal was still in Ohio. 
At the time of the offer, counter-offer, and acceptance, the 
property was listed with Marita Stewart, Broker of Lake Country 
Real Estate and agent Owen Mullen. At the time, Marita Stewart 
and Owen Mullen had also been the agent for JLZ in the purchase of 
the 3 parcels to the East of the Dock-n-Shop, and represented JLZ 
in the offer and counter-offer with ALBAR. 
JLZ's offer to ALBAR to purchase the Dock-N-Shop and the 
executed purchase and sale agreement provided for inspections of 
the property by JLZ, and an "as-is" condition clause at closing. 
The purchase and sale agreement included a clause in the counter-
offer #1 as item 3. that "Seller has all responsibility and 
liability for recent gasoline spill on property and adjoining 
property." ALBAR rejected a term in the proposed Addendum #1 by 
JLZ that provided that "2. Offer is contingent upon EPA giving 
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cl.osure to gasoline spill on site." 
After the Purchase And Sale Agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2) 
was entered into, Echo VanderWal went to the real property only 
once prior to closing for a meeting. Present were Echo VanderWal, 
her children and family members, Marita Stewart, Owen Mullen, and 
Al. Sudau on behalf of ALBAR. 
JLZ in the offer by paragraphs 23, 24, and 25 and paragraph 3 
of the Addendum #2 and paragraph of 4 of the Counter Offer #1, 
accepted the condition of the property, subject to a 45 day 
inspection period, and chose to have inspections. The offer by 
JLZ indicated a contingency for a conditional use permit for 
condominiums on the "ajoining [sic - adjoining] property." The 
counter-offer, item 2, indicates likewise a conditional use permit 
for the "adjoining property." 
JLZ, prior to closing with ALBAR, on August 4 or 5, 2005, 
submitted a Conditional Use Permit to the City of Priest River for 
a "Mixed Use Development Of Residential And Retail" (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 7") . 
Item 3 of the counter offer provides "Sel.ler has al.l 
responsibility and liability for recent gasoline spill on property 
and adjoining property." 
Prior to closing, VanderWal/JLZ proposed seller financing of 
a portion of the $539,000 purchase price with $250,000 carried on 
a note and deed of trust (which provided for non-removal. of the 
building) by the Seller ALBAR (Defendant's Exhibit I). 
Prior to closing, Echo VanderWal./JLZ made no indication to 
ALBAR of not continuing the operations of the Dock-n-Shop as an 
ongoing commercial concern, consisting of a convenience store, 
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fuel sales, and marina. RE-11 Addendum #3 (Plaintiffs Exhibit 2) 
dated August 29, 2005 signed by both ALBAR and JLZ, similarly 
provides for continued commercial operation by ALBAR including aid 
in the transfer of all licenses for operations to JLZ prior to and 
after closing. 
Closing between ALBAR and JLZ occurred on or about September 
15, 2005. The existing PSTF insurance policy for the remaining two 
(2) USTs was transferred from ALBAR to JLZ (Defendant's Exhibit J 
& Defendant's Exhibit K). 
At closing ALBAR took back the note secured by a deed of 
trust upon the property. ALBAR was the holder of a Deed of Trust 
Note (herein "Note"), dated September 6, 2005 in the original 
principal sum of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND AND 00/100 DOLLARS 
($250,000.00). The maturity date of the note was modified by an 
extension dated August 24, 2006 (Defendant's Exhibits A and B). 
ALBAR was the beneficiary of a Deed of Trust Including Due-On-Sale 
Rider (Defendant's Exhibit C) securing said Note, recorded 
September 16, 2005 as Instrument No. 687257, records of Bonner 
County, Idaho, concerning real property within Bonner County, 
Idaho, described as follows: 
PARCEL I: 
The Easterly most 197.5 feet of the following described 
tract: 
Commencing at a point on the South line of the right of 
way of the Great Northern Railroad Company, 375 feet 
West of the East line of Lot 6, Section 25, Township 56 
North, Range 5 West, Boise Meridian; 
thence South on a line at right angles with the said 
right of way to the North Bank of the Pend Oreille 
River; 
thence West along the said North Bank to a point where 
the same in intersected by the line of a parcel of land 
sold to the Village of Priest River, by Deed, dated 
April 28, 1956, and now used as a right of way and 
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approach for the bridge across the said river; 
thence North along the East line to the South line of 
the right of way of the Great Northern Railroad 
Company; 
thence East along said right of way to the true point 
of beginning. 
Excepting therefrom the following described tract: 
Beginning at a point on the South line of the 
Burlington Northern Railroad Company right of way, 
375.0 feet West of the East line of Government Lot 6, 
Section 25, Township 56 North, Range 5 West, Boise 
Meridian, Bonner County, Idaho; 
thence South 1°20'48" East along an existing fence to 
the North Bank of the Pend Oreille River; 
thence Northwesterly along the North Bank of the Pend 
Oreille River a distance of approximately 202 feet to a 
point which is South from a point on the South right of 
way line of the Burlington Northern Railroad Company a 
distance of 197.5 feet West of the Point of Beginning; 
thence North 4.0 feet; 
thence Southeasterly parallel with the North Bank of 
the Pend Oreille River to a point which is South from a 
point on the South of the right of way line of the 
Burlington Northern Railroad Company a distance of 
100.0 feet from the Point of Beginning; 
thence North to said Point; 
thence East along said right of way line a distance of 
100.0 feet to the Point of Beginning. 
PARCEL II: 
That portion of the Burlington Northern and Santa Fee 
Railway Company's (formerly Great Northern Railway 
Company) 300.00 Station Ground property at Priest 
River, Idaho, being 200.00 feet wide on the Northerly 
side and 100.0 feet wide on the Southerly side of said 
Railway Company's Main Track centerline, as now located 
and constructed upon, over and across Government Lot 6 
of Section 25, Township 56 North, Range 5 West, B.M., 
Bonner County, Idaho, described as follows, to-wit: 
Beginning at the intersection with the Easterly line of 
that certain easement from Great Northern Railway 
Company to Bonner County, Idaho, for roadway purposes 
of the Southerly extension of Wisconsin Street dated 
April 15, 1958 with the Southerly line of said State 
Ground property; thence Easterly along said Southerly 
line 371.0 feet; thence Northerly at right angles to 
said Southerly line 50.0 feet; thence Westerly parallel 
with said Main Track centerline 10.0 feet; thence 
Northerly at right angles to said Main Track centerline 
30.0 feet; thence Westerly parallel with and 20.0 feet 
Southerly, as measured at right angles from said Main 
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Track centerline 360 feet more or less, to the Easterly 
line of said easement for the Southerly extension of 
Wisconsin Street; thence Southerly along said Easterly 
line to the True Point of Beginning. 
JLZ is the maker of said Note in favor of ALBAR and the grantor of 
the Deed of Trust in favor of ALBAR. 
After purchasing the ALBAR property, JLZ also purchased 
additional parcels adjoining the Dock-N-Shop to the east. 
Immediately after closing with ALBAR, Echo VanderWal/JLZ 
closed the store, gave away the inventory and contents of the 
business and ceased operations of the Dock-n-Shop, which was the 
first time ALBAR had any notice of such intention. 
Prior to closing Echo VanderWal did not contact the IDEQ, 
PSTF, or Kleinfelder regarding the remediation of the Dock-n-Shop 
property. Following the closing of the transaction and the 
closing of the Dock-n-Shop business by JLZ, Echo VanderWal 
returned to Ohio (with a two week trip to Africa in the last two 
weeks of October 2005) until a Christmas time trip to Idaho in 
December 2005 and/or January 2006 consisting of one to two weeks, 
and then she returned to Ohio. 
In January 2006, JLZ had a development team meeting regarding 
the Priest River real property, including the three parcels to the 
East, the Dock-n-Shop property, and the adjoining parcels to the 
West that had been acquired or were under contract for purchase. 
Since the closing on the Dock-n-Shop, Echo VanderWal still had not 
contacted the IDEQ, PSTF, or Kleinfelder regarding the ongoing 
fuel release remediation of the Dock-n-Shop property. 
At some point after the January 2006 development team 
meeting, Echo VanderWal requested Steve Klatt to make contacts 
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regarding the remediation, extending the note, and removal of the 
building from the Dock-n-Shop site. Echo VanderWal was in Ohio at 
the time. Steve Klatt on behalf of JLZ began conversing and 
corresponding with Al Sudau on behalf of ALBAR. By April 2006, 
Steve Klatt had prepared a table of issues and the respective 
parties' concerns as developed from the discussions (Defendant's 
Exhibit AA), which were the soil remediation, extending the note, 
and removal of the building. 
The discussions and contacts between Steve Klatt and Al Sudau 
were cordial and a good relationship existed. (See also 
Defendant's Exhibit BB). Steve Klatt was also in contact with 
DEQ, PSTF, and Kleinfelder during the late spring and early summer 
2006 and prepared a Memorandum dated June 25, 2006 (Defendant's 
Exhibit L) and he prepared correspondence with Echo VanderWal 
(Defendant's Exhibit N). 
Steve Klatt in discussions with IDEQ, PSTF, and Kleinfelder 
was proposing on behalf of JLZ the removal of the building and was 
indicating the potential for future residential use of the 
property. In the end of July, 2006, a potential meeting was 
discussed and scheduled to review the proposed course by JLZ. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 0 and Defendants Exhibits 0, CC, DD, EE, FF, 
GG). Al Sudau was concerned with the removal of the building and 
had ongoing discussions with Steve Klatt regarding the requested 
removal compared to the note and deed of trust provisions for 
maintaining the property and the structures, which were security 
for the debt. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 10 and Defendant's Exhibits 
HH) • 
A meeting was held at IDEQ in Coeur d'Alene on August 16, 
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2006 regarding JLZ's proposed course for the remediation. In late 
August 2006, Echo VanderWal/JLZ requested an extension of the note 
and ALBAR agreed (Defendant's Exhibit B). At the end of August 
2006, Echo VanderWal came to Idaho from Ohio and removed the 
building upon the Dock-n-Shop property over the objections from 
ALBAR (Defendant's Exhibit II). 
On August 29, 2009 ALBAR re-structured the dissemination of 
information and the contacts regarding remediation, so that ALBAR 
was included (Defendants Exhibit's JJ, KK, LL, MM, NN, 00, PP, 
QQ) . 
In late September or early October, 2006, Echo VanderWal went 
to Africa and upon her return moved from Ohio to Idaho. Echo 
VanderWal was in Idaho from November 2006 until March/April or 
April/May 2007 when she was in Africa for 2 months, and then in 
Idaho until December 2007, at which point she was on the East 
Coast or in Africa except for during December 2008 and January 
2009 when she was in Idaho and except for during the trial in this 
matter. 
Through the fall of 2006 the PSTF funded remediation process 
on behalf of ALBAR continued, with the submittal of a Confirmation 
Sampling Work Plan as the site was close to closure under the 
existing Corrective Action Plan (Defendant's Exhibit VV) as well 
as additional boring and sampling under the location of the former 
building during low water. 
In early December 2006 contract was made regarding JLZ 
enrolling the property in the IDEQ Voluntary Remediation Program 
(Defendant's Exhibit P). In December 2006, Echo VanderWal, in an 
emotional state, telephoned Al Sudau concerned over what 
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information Owen Mullen had in regards to the remediation of the 
Dock-n-Shop property. Al Sudau reviewed that Mullen had been 
directed to gather all the information from IDEQ, PSTF, and 
Kleinfelder that was wanted by JLZ. Echo VanderWal called a 
second time that same date, expressing concern that she was 
financially going under and couldn't build her new house or buy 
Christmas gifts for her children. 
In January 2007 Echo VanderWal on behalf of JLZ instructed 
her attorney to send a demand letter regarding the sharing of and 
access to information (Plaintiff's Exhibit 15). ALBAR thereafter 
instituted a written contact policy for all remediation and 
contact, and Steve Klatt, Kleinfelder, and IDEQ were uncertain as 
to the basis for the demand letter by JLZ or the assertions of 
withholding information (Plaintiff's Exhibit 16 and Defendant's 
Exhibits YY, and ZZ). ALBAR attempted to make sure the public 
information was available through contact with IDEQ and contact 
with ALBAR. Steve Klatt acknowledged progress (Defendant's 
Exhibits ZZ, AAA, BBB, CCC, DDD, EEE, and FFF) . 
In late January 2007, the analytical results from the 
samplings under the former building were back, which identified 
four isolated soil contaminations, which information was conveyed 
to Steve Klatt (Defendant's Exhibits NNN). Kleinfelder also 
continued discussion with Steve Klatt regarding JLZ removing the 
other two USTs as part of a residential remediation level and the 
delay by Echo VanderWal in responding (Defendant's Exhibits 000 
and PPP) . 
In February 2007 and beyond, efforts continued to get a 
response from Echo VanderWal/JLZ for the removal of the two UST's 
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as part of a dig and haul process for under the former building, 
as well as attempts to get a response for moving forward with a 
dig and haul and injection plan modification to the existing 
remediation (Defendant's Exhibits Q, QQQ, RRR, SSS, TTT, UUU, VVV, 
WWW, XXX, YYY, ZZZ, AAAA, BBBB, CCCC, DDDD, EEEE, FFFF, GGGG, 
HHHH, IIII, JJJJ, KKKK, LLLL, MMMM, NNNN, 0000, and PPPP) 
In February 16, 2007, while the Kleinfelder efforts were 
underway, JLZ engaged its own environmental engineer Golder & 
Associates, who reported that per the IDEQ, Soil remediation was 
nearly complete, with additional limited soil removal needed to 
meet a residential scenario and that in regards to Groundwater 
remediation that Kleinfelder felt the standards had been met, but 
that IDEQ would likely require a Deed Restriction, which would not 
impact residential use because of the municipal water supply 
available to serve the property (Plaintiff's Exhibit 18 and 
Defendant's Exhibits Exhibit R). 
Echo VanderWal continued here secretive approach, engaging an 
environmental engineer and delaying responses and information to 
ALBAR and for the remediation (Defendant's Exhibits S, T, U, V, W, 
and X) . 
In the spring of 2007, a prospective buyer was in contact 
with Steve Klatt (Defendant's Exhibits Y). In the end of June and 
into July 2007, a modification to the remediation was not moving 
forward to the satisfaction of JLZ and Echo VanderWal/JLZ moved 
forward Golder's involvement, including site visits with Golder 
and Kleinfelder personal, as well as Steve Klatt. 
Bye-mail dated July 5, 2007, ALBAR again offered to allow 
JLZ to prepare a plan and funding for remediation and that ALBAR 
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would pay that sum for an indemnification for clean up 
(Defendant's Exhibits BBBBB). Also by July 2007, commercial clean 
up levels were consistently met (Defendants Exhibit CCCCC and 
HHHHH) . 
JLZ failed to make the payment due July 16, 2007 to ALBAR on 
the promissory note. JLZ failed to make any of the monthly 
payments due after July 16, 2007, and failed to pay upon the 
maturity date of the note on September 16, 2007. 
By the beginning of August 2007, JLZ proceeded with removal 
of the two USTs without notice to ALBAR (Defendant's Exhibit GGGGG 
and JJJJJ). Even in late August 2007, the IDEQ was considering 
seeking residential level cleanups, solely based upon the actions 
of JLZ (Defendant's Exhibits NNNNN and QQQQQ). 
Into the fall of 2007 Groundwater thresholds for commercial 
sites were met again, making four in a row (Defendant's Exhibits 
RRRRR and SSSSS) with only the four isolated Soil locations under 
the former building being present (Defendant's Exhibit TTTTT). 
In the fall of 2007, JLZ sought enrollment of the Dock-n-Shop 
property into the IDEQ Voluntary Rmnediation Program and Pilot 
Project Funds (Defendant's Exhibit WWWWW attached Exhibit B, 
Exhibit XXXXX and Defendant's Exhibit FFFFFF). The enrollment 
created liability for JLZ for remediation where none previously 
existed and provided for reimbursement of up to 70% of costs or 
$150,000.00, whichever was greater. 
ALBAR through its PSTF insurance asserted to IDEQ that the 
actions of JLZ in submitting its own remediation plan in the face 
of the existing plan was problematic (Defendant's Exhibits WWWWW, 
UUUUU, VVVVV) and submitted comments in regards to the JLZ plan, 
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not objecting to the clean up efforts proposed, but rather 
identifying issues for resolution as part of the process 
(Defendant's Exhibits YYYYY, zzzzz, AAAAAA). 
The IDEQ entered into an agreement with JLZ for the Voluntary 
Remediation plan and Pilot Project Funding and terminated the IDEQ 
consent order with ALBAR, effective April 10, 2008 (Defendant's 
Exhibits BBBBBB, CCCCCC, and DDDDDD as to the portions admitted). 
JLZ proceeded with its own clean up efforts, and had entered 
the monitoring phase by the time of trial in June 2009. At trial, 
JLZ had failed to perform the most recent required monitoring of 
the remediation work, and had not received an approved clean up 
status for the site, nor any Certificate of Completion or Covenant 
Not To Sue regarding the Dock-n-Shop site from the IDEQ. 
From the conclusion of the trial in June 2009, time elapsed 
until the Court to announce its decision, followed by proceedings 
on motions to reconsider and motions for attorney fees. On July 
27, 2010, the Judgment And Decree of Sale was entered by the 
Court, followed by the Appellant ALBAR filing this appeal. 
Unbeknownst to ALBAR, following trial, IDEQ paid for the 
necessary quarterly monitoring for the JLZ remediation work 
(Supplemental Exhibit "F"). The necessary monitoring was 
completed and in June, 2010, JLZ obtained a Certificate of 
Completion and a Covenant Not To Sue from the IDEQ for the Dock-N-
Shop property. (Supplemental Exhibits "A" and "B") . 
Coincidentally with the entry of the judgment, on July 27, 
~010, JLZ applied for reimbursement from the Idaho Department of 
Environmental Quality ("IDEQ") for clean up and remediation costs. 
(Supplemental Exhibit "C"). The reimbursement sought included 
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significant sums as awarded by the Court as offset damages in the 
action against ALBAR. 
On September 7, 2010, the IDEQ required additional 
information from JLZ for reimbursement. (Supplemental Exhibit 
"D"). On or about March 1, 2011, JLZ submitted is revised 
application for reimbursement through the IDEQ pilot program of 
its clean up costs. (Supplemental Exhibit "E") . 
On or about March 21, 2011, DEQ approved reimbursement to JLZ 
for clean up costs in the net reimbursable sum of $145,021.95 
(Supplemental Exhibits "F" and "G"). The total qualifying 
remediation costs were $217,950.31, with the program being capped 
at $150,000.00 for reimbursement. The IDEQ also deducted from the 
available $150,000.00, the sum of $4,978.00 that the DEQ had 
directly disbursed to obtain the last monitoring and reports 
necessary for the site clearance. The net amount approved and 
received on March 29, 2011 by JLZ from the IDEQ reimbursement 
program was $145,021.95. 
Albar sought relief from the judgment for the sums received 
by JLZ. On September 30, 2011, the District Court entered its 
Memorandum Decision And Order Re: Albar's Motion For Relief From 
Judgment, denying any relief for the offset damages awarded 
against ALBAR for the sums received by JLZ from the IDEQ for 
remediation costs. 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The Appellant ALBAR'S statement of the issues on appeal is 
as follows: 
(a) Did the District Court err in concluding that 
ALBAR, INC. breached its contract with JLZ ENTERPRISES, INC. 
for remediation? 
(b) Did the District Court err in deter.mining and 
awarding damages to JLZ ENTERPRISES, INC. for breach of 
contract? 
(c) Did the District Court err in not awarding 
attorney fees and costs to ALBAR, INC.? 
(d) Did the District Court err in not granting relief 
to Albar for funds received by JLZ from the DEQ for 
remediation? 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
The Appellant ALBAR seeks an award attorney fees on appeal 
against the Respondent JLZ ENTERPRISES, INC., pursuant to the 
Note and the Deed of Trust, the Real Estate Purchase And Sale 
Agreement, Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 12-121, Idaho Code § 6-402, 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and/or the Idaho Appellate 
Rules. 
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ARGUMENT ON APPEAL 
I. ALBAR, INC. DID NOT BREACH ITS CONTRACT WITH JLZ ENTERPRISES, 
INC. FOR REMEDIATION 
The central issues in this case is the interpretation of the 
accepted Purchase And Sale Agreement provision in Counter-offer 
#1, paragraph 3, which provides "Seller has all responsibility and 
liability for recent gasoline spill on property and adjoining 
property." (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2). The Respondent JLZ asserted 
a breach of contract by Appellant ALBAR in not t~ely completing 
remediation of the contamination from the fuel leak in 2003. JLZ 
asserted damages resulted from such a breach. ALBAR disputed any 
breach of contract and/or the damages requested. 
In Potlatch Educ. Ass'n v. Potlatch Sch. Dist. No. 285, 148 
Idaho 630, 633, (2010), reh'g denied (Mar. 17, 2010) the Idaho 
Supreme Court held in regards to the interpretation of a 
contract, as follows: 
When interpreting a contract, this Court begins with 
the document's language. Cristo Viene Pentecostal 
Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 308, 160 P.3d 743, 747 
(2007). "In the absence of ambiguity, the document must 
be construed in its plain, ordinary and proper sense, 
according to the meaning derived from the plain wording 
of the instrument." C & G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 
765, 25 P.3d 76, 78 (2001). Interpreting an unambiguous 
contract and determining whether there has been a 
violation of that contract is an issue of law subject 
to free review. Qpportunity, L.L.C. v. Ossewarde, 136 
Idaho 602, 605-06, 38 P.3d 1258, 1261-62 (2002). A 
contract term is ambiguous when there are two different 
reasonable interpretations or the language is 
nonsensical. Swanson v. Beco Constr. Co., 145 Idaho 59, 
62, 175 P.3d 748, 751 (2007). Whether a contract is 
ambiguous is a question of law, but interpreting an 
ambiguous term is an issue of fact. Bakker v. Thunder 
Spring-Wareham, L.L.C., 141 Idaho 185, 190, 108 P.3d 
332, 337 (2005) (quotation omitted) . 
The District Court, in announcing its decision, made several 
conclusions of law regarding the agreement between ALBAR and JLZ, 
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which are set forth in the Court Trial and Judge's Decision 
Transcript, pages 1078 through 1088. The District Court relied 
upon several factors in making that determination. The relevant 
positions of the parties as to the interpretation of the 
contractual term must be measured against the provisions of the 
contract and the conduct at the time of the relevant facts and 
circumstances. 
In J.R. Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 614 (2006), the 
Idaho Supreme Court explained as follows: 
If the provisions of a contract are ambiguous, the 
interpretation of those provisions is a question of fact 
which focuses upon the intent of the parties. Bream v. 
Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364, 79 P.3d 723 (2003). The 
determination of the parties' intent is to be determined by 
looking at the contract as a whole, the language used in the 
document, the circumstances under which it was made, the 
objective and purpose of the particular provision, and any 
construction placed upon it by the contracting parties as 
shown by their conduct or dealings. Ramco v. H-K 
Contractors, Inc., 118 Idaho 108, 794 P.2d 1381 (1990); 
Internationa~ Eng'g Co., Inc. v. Daum Indus., Inc., 102 
Idaho 363, 630 P.2d 155 (1981). A party's subjective, 
undisclosed intent is immaterial to the interpretation of a 
contract. As explained in 17 Am.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 347 
(2004) : 
A party's subjective, undisclosed intent is immaterial 
to the interpretation of a contract, as under the 
objective law of contract interpretation, the court 
will give force and effect to the words of the contract 
without regard to what the parties to the contract 
thought it meant or what they actually intended for it 
to mean. The court will not attempt to ascertain the 
actual mental processes of the parties in entering into 
the particular contract; rather the law presumes that 
the parties understood the import of their contract and 
that they had the intention which its terms manifest. 
A. The Purchase And Sale Agreement Did Not Require 
Remediation Be Completed To JLZ's Satisfaction. 
The Purchase And Sale Agreement ("PSA") does not provide for 
ALBAR to remediate or obtain DEQ approval of a clean up of the 
site to the satisfaction of JLZ. At closing and following 
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closing, ALBAR remained the party in agreement with the IDEQ under 
the Consent Order. Paragraph 3 of Counter-Offer #1 only provides 
for ALBAR to have responsibility and liability for the petroleum 
leak. JLZ's plans for the property are not the subject of the 
agreement, and at the time of the sale, the business on the 
property was an ongoing concern, which is contrary to JLZ's 
assertion breach because the property was not "cleared for 
development." The PSA did not require a parcel cleared for 
development, and to the contrary, JLZ bought the property and 
business as is, subject to an existing Consent Order and an 
existing ongoing remediation. 
In Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468 (Idaho App. 2006), the 
Idaho Court of Appeals interpreted a purchase and sale agreement 
with addenda provision that the Seller clear title. The Court of 
Appeals explained in regard to a party having an obligation beyond 
the control of the party, such as to obtain marketable title, that 
the condition precedent gives rise to an implied duty of good 
faith to attempt to perform the condition. The PSA between JLZ 
and ALBAR did not require ALBAR to obtain a specific remediation. 
ALBAR met its good faith duty compared to the sale of the property 
and ongoing business. JLZ did not bargain for, and ALBAR is not 
liable, for any set period of remediation (whether within a 
reasonable time or not), nor any specific remediation result. 
B. The Conduct of JLZ Does Not Create Liability for ALBAR 
Albar asserts that the relevant documents and conduct for the 
Court to use to interpret the contract, all occurred prior to or 
at closing on September 15, 2005. Those are: 
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1. Albar had a long operating commercial convenience 
store, fuel sales, and marina business, known as the Dock-n-Shop. 
2. In 2003 a fuel release occurred and a remediation 
system was in place that had prevented fuel from reaching the 
Priest River and that allowed the continued operations of the 
Dock-n-Shop. A Consent Order was in place and a commercial 
remediation plan was established for the property and approved, or 
at least allowed to proceed, by the Idaho Department of 
Environmental Quality (IDEQ). 
3. Investigation and remediation under the Dock-N-Shop 
building would have required structural damage and changes to the 
building and ongoing commercial operations. Such a course was not 
required by IDEQ, regardless of JLZ asserted interpretation of the 
non-specific 2004 IDEQ correspondence. 
4. JLZ's June 14, 2005 offer for the property and Albar's 
June 16, 2005 counter-offer, which resulted in an accepted 
Purchase And Sale Agreement ("PSA") on June 16, 2005, is the 
contract at issue here. 
5. All of the language of the PSA provides for CUP 
residential or hotel/rental development of the adjoining property, 
not the Dock-n-Shop property. 
6. The PSA also provided for JLZ to accept the property in 
it's as is condition, and that JLZ chose to have inspections and 
investigations of that condition. 
7. Paragraph 3 of the Counter Offer #1 in the PSA is the 
sole provision upon which JLZ asserts its breach of contract. It 
provides: "Seller has all responsibility and liability for recent 
gasoline spill on property and adjoining property." The spill 
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occurred in May 2003, with the PSA being entered into in June 
2005, which would define the term "recent" as over two years. 
8. The as-is provision and the JLZ inspection and 
investigation provisions, are not obviated by the provision in 
paragraph 3 of the Counter Offer. Those terms can and should be 
interpreted for a consistent result, given the facts and 
circumstances at that t~e. 
9. The rejected Addendum #2 which JLZ proposed provided 
for closure of the gasoline spill remediation on the site. 
10. Paragraph 3 of the Counter Offer #1 in the PSA does not 
provide for any express requirement for a specific final 
remediation, let alone a time frame for remediation. The 
remediation plan in existence at the time of closing between ALBAR 
and JLZ was for a commercial operation. 
11. Prior to closing, JLZ continued its later shown 
apparent charade of an intention of operating the business, and 
Addendum #3 dated August 29, 2005 provides for Albar to aid in the 
transfer of the licenses to operate prior to and after closing. 
12. Also, prior to closing, JLZ apparently had enough 
information to determine that institutional lending would not be 
available because of environmental concerns and JLZ proposed that 
Albar carry part of the purchase price, with a pledge of the 
property, including the building and other improvements. 
13. It is readily apparent that Albar directed all 
inquiries as to the status of the fuel spill and remediation to 
the regulatory authorities IDEQ, the insurer PSTF, and the 
contractor handing the remediation Kleinfelder, and authorized 
release of all information. 
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14. It is also readily apparent that JLZ performed some 
sort of investigation and inspection as to the fuel spill and 
remediation, as Echo VanderWal testified institutional lending was 
not available. JLZ had also previously purchased the adjoining 3 
parcels, which included impacts from the fuel release. 
15. At closing, the intention of the parties as set forth 
in the documents making up the PSA must be the yard stick to 
measure the contractual obligations by the provision in paragraph 
3 in the Counter Offer. 
16. Albar sold a going commercial concern, with a 
remediation in place that allowed the ongoing operations, and took 
back a security interest in the property and buildings. 
17. JLZ had investigated the fuel spill and existing 
remediation, and closed on its purchase. Also, it submitted a CUP 
application to the City of Priest River for a mixed use 
residential and retail on adjoining property. 
JLZ asserts as part of its urged interpretation for its 
asserted breach of contract, that certain statements were made by 
both A1 Sudau and Owen Mullen during Echo VanderWal's only visit 
to the property prior to closing, which was after the PSA was 
entered into. Echo VanderWal asserts that at the meeting that A1 
Sudau on behalf of ALBAR and that Owen Mullen each separately 
stated to her that "the soils were remediated and clear and that 
only two monitoring session were need." Al Sudau asserts on 
behalf of ALBAR that at the meeting at the property with Echo 
VanderWal, no such statement was made by him, and that he did not 
hear Owen Mullen make such a statement. No other corroborating 
witness was offered by Echo VanderWal as to the asserted 
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statements by Al Sudau on behalf of ALBAR or the asserted 
statements by Owen Mullen. 
The credibility of Echo VanderWal and her ability to recall 
and her ability to separate her emotions from her recollection, 
cast great doubt upon these assertions. Also, at the time of 
purchasing the three parcels to the East, and then entering into 
the Purchase And Sale Agreement with ALBAR, Echo VanderWal 
testified she had a long relationship with Marita Stewart and 
trusted Marita Stewart and Owen Mullen, both of Lake Country Real 
Estate, which was JLZ's long time broker. 
If any such statements were made, the evidence supports a 
finding and conclusion that Al Sudau and ALBAR were not aware of 
such matters. The back and forth between the offer and counter-
offer, show that Albar was not willing to condition the purchase 
and sale upon the provision in Addendum #1 that "2. Offer is 
contingent upon EPA giving closure to gasoline spill on site." If 
such statements were made and/or if JLZ understood or believed 
statements of those type to be accurate, JLZ did nothing to 
include such obligations or contingencies in the accepted PSA, and 
further undertook its own 45 inspection period. 
Any purported statement or representation asserted by or on 
behalf of JLZ may not be attributed to the Seller ALBAR and may 
not be used to interpret provision 3 of Counter Offer #1 by the 
operation of Idaho Code § 54-2093(1) as such would have been a 
wrongful act, error, omission, or misrepresentation, of which 
ALBAR and Al Sudau had no actual knowledge of, nor should have 
reasonably known of. 
Similarly, any purported assertion of interpretation based 
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upon the listing materials or the Seller's Property Disclosure 
Form, is not available, given the merger/integration clause of the 
PSA. Additionally, Ms. VanderWal's testimony as to when and if 
she reviewed the document, failed to establish any relevant time 
frame. 
From the time of contracting by the PSA and to closing, JLZ 
was on notice of the existing fuel release, the existing 
remediation plan which was IDEQ approved and regulated and PSTF 
financed. JLZ was on notice of all reasonable information that a 
reasonable investigation at the time of purchase would have 
revealed. JLZ only contracted for ALBAR to remain responsible and 
liable for the ramifications of the fuel release. 
In Hunter v. Shields, 131 Idaho 148, 153 (1998) the Idaho 
Supreme Court reiterated that: 
This Court has stated that when one is purchasing land, the 
rule of caveat emptor applies and that "whatever is notice 
enough to excite the attention of a man of ordinary prudence 
and prompt him to further inquiry, amounts to notice of all 
such facts as a reasonable investigation would disclose." 
Hi~~ v. Federa~ Land Bank, 59 Idaho 136, 141, 80 P.2d 789, 
791 (1938). See a~so, Farre~~ v. Brown, 111 Idaho 1027, 
1033, 729 P.2d 1090, 1096 (Ct.App.1986). 
By the agreement, JLZ choose to have inspections and JLZ's 
consultants were involved prior to closing on September 16, 2005. 
In Anderson v. Rex Hayes Family Trust, 145 Idaho 741, 743 (Idaho 
2008), the Idaho Supreme Court held that: "One who purchases 
property is put on notice of title disputes that a reasonable 
investigation would reveal. Duff v. Seubert, 110 Idaho 865, 870, 
719 P.2d 1125, 1130 (1985)." 
JLZ contracted to purchase and then closed on the purchase of 
the real property with a pre-existing fuel spill remediation plan 
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in existence and in operation with positive progress. JLZ was on 
notice of the extent of the contamination and the manner of 
remediation. JLZ did not bargain for anything different. Any 
harm or damage to JLZ were based solely upon the actions of JLZ. 
C. The Post Closing Conduct Does Not Result In Liability 
By ALBAR 
If the conduct after closing is relevant to the 
interpretation of the PSA (and the respective obligations of the 
parties), after closing, it is readily apparent that JLZ had not 
informed itself sufficiently as to environmental concerns and 
processes regarding remediation prior to purchasing the first 
three parcels to the west, then closing on the Dock-N-Shop 
property, and then its later efforts and acquisition of adjoining 
properties to the east. 
The lack of investigation and planning by Echo VanderWal/JLZ, 
an absentee landowner prone to emotional shutdown and/or emotional 
outbursts, does not result in the liability for Albar as sought. 
The evidence shows that only due to JLZ not continuing the 
commercial operations, did the IDEQ seek discussions to move the 
goalposts for remediation from commercial to residential 
standards. 
The evidence shows that JLZ did not understand that 
purchasing the two UST resulted in her liability and 
responsibility for those USTs. Although not provided for in any 
reasonable interpretation of the intention at the time of 
contracting and closing, JLZ asserts that removal of the building 
and removal the USTs was Albar's responsibility. The PSA terms 
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are contrary to such an interpretation. In fact, JLZ had pledged 
those improvements to Albar as security for the unpaid purchase 
price. Further, there is no showing that such removal was 
required to obtain IDEQ clearance for the ALBAR remediation 
pursuant to the ALBAR Consent Order. 
Paragraph 3 of the Counter Offer #1 does not provide for any 
express requirement for a final remediation, let alone a time 
frame for remediation. JLZ's actions in ceasing operations of the 
ongoing commercial business and its statement of possible plans 
for the property, brought about discussion, although no actual 
agreement or modification of the remediation, by IDEQ for 
residential standards as opposed to commercial levels. 
JLZ was the only one that required or wanted the Dock-n-Shop 
building and/or the two USTs removed. Such a course was not 
required for remediation of the site as an ongoing commercial 
operation. 
JLZ did not present any evidence of any Notice of Violation 
being issued by the IDEQ to ALBAR nor any enforcement action by 
IDEQ against ALBAR as to the remediation being conducted. It was 
the conduct of JLZ by voluntarily taking on the liability and 
responsibility for remediation, which resulted in the Consent 
Order between the IDEQ and ALBAR being terminated. 
The only witness to testify in the action that had been at 
the IDEQ during the Albar remediation plan formulation was Paula 
Lyon. JLZ did not bring forth any witness from IDEQ to support the 
contentions and positions it urged regarding what was necessary 
for IDEQ clearance. 
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D. JLZ's Enrollment In The Voluntary Cleanup Program 
Relieved ALBAR of Its Consent Order Obligations 
By JLZ's conduct, the Dock-N-Shop real property was enrolled 
into the IDEQ Voluntary Cleanup program, and the Consent Order 
between ALBAR and the IDEQ was terminated and ALBAR was released 
from liability. JLZ waived or released any obligation of ALBAR, 
assumed the risk, prevented performance by ALBAR, and/or was 
estopped to assert any breach for damages that in any way relate 
to JLZ's Voluntary Clean efforts, which precluded any further 
efforts by ALBAR. 
In actuality, JLZ urged an interpretation of the contact 
contrary to the terms of the face of the contract. By the post-
closing conduct by JLZ, the actual obligations of Albar under the 
contract could not be met. The conduct of JLZ directly impaired 
and impeded Albar's contractual obligations to JLZ regarding the 
ongoing remediation. Specifically: JLZ ceased operating the 
commercial business and ceased using the two USTs. JLZ, contrary 
to the contract and the CUP application, made proposed residential 
uses on the Dock-N-Shop property to IDEQ, which were not the as is 
condition of the property. 
Echo VanderWal of JLZ at some point in time convinced herself 
that no matter what it wanted done on the property, whether as to 
specifics for the remediation or as to a timeline, that Albar had 
to do it. The conduct and actions of JLZ cannot withstand the 
scrutiny of reasonableness, required by the law. 
Albar made several reasonable proposals to JLZ as the dispute 
arose and the issues went forward regarding remediation. The 
evidence shows that JLZ took only one consistent position: ALBAR 
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MOST DO WHAT JLZ WANTS. JLZ made no proposals for resolution 
given the changed circumstances of its uses of the property after 
closing and after acquiring additional properties. 
It is important to recognize that at the time of the trial in 
June 2009, JLZ had not accomplished what it complained of Albar 
not accomplishing. JLZ did not obtain IDEQ closure regarding the 
petroleum release until in June 2010, and did not complete it 
reimbursement until in 2011. 
E. ALBAR Did Not Breach The Contract With JLZ 
JLZ failed to show a breach of contract by ALBAR of the 
contractual terms. Paragraph 3 of the Counter Offer #1 does not 
require remediation to JLZ's sole desire. ALBAR met its implied 
duty of good faith. The conduct of JLZ was the cause of any 
damage asserted by JLZ. The District Court erred in finding a 
breach of contract by ALBAR in favor of JLZ, and such a finding 
and conclusion should be reversed on appeal. 
II. ALBAR, INC. IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR REMEDIATION BY JLZ 
ENTERPRISES, INC. AS DAMAGES 
In the event the District Court's findings and conclusions of 
a breach of contract are upheld, ALBAR is not responsible for 
damages as awarded by the District Court. JLZ asserted several 
damages for breach of contract and was awarded damages for 
expenditures made by JLZ in pursuing its own remediation to its 
own standards. 
In Silver Creek Computers, Inc. v. Petra, Inc., 136 Idaho 
879, 884-85 (2002), the Idaho Supreme Court reiterated regarding 
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damages, as follows: 
Damages recoverable for breach of contract are those that 
arise naturally from the breach and are reasonably 
foreseeable. Appe~ v. LePage, 135 Idaho 133, 15 P.3d 1141 
(2000). Damages need not have been precisely and 
specifically foreseeable, but only such as were reasonably 
foreseeable by the parties at the time they contracted. Id.; 
Suitts v. First Sec. Bank or Idaho, N.A., 110 Idaho 15, 22, 
713 P.2d 1374, 1381 (1985). Consequential damages are not 
recoverable unless specifically within the contemplation of 
the parties at time of contracting. Appe~ v. LePage, 135 
Idaho 133, 15 P.3d 1141 (2000); Brown's Tie & Lumber Co. v. 
Chicago Tit~e Co. or Idaho, 115 Idaho 56, 61, 764 P.2d 423, 
428 (1988). 
JLZ undertook major work on the premises by removing the pre-
existing building and portions of the ALBAR remediation system in 
place. JLZ ceased use of the existing USTs and later removing the 
USTs. JLZ also enrolled the property into the IDEQ voluntary 
remediation and pilot project funding programs, undertook its own 
planned remediation, and voluntarily accepted liability for 
remediation. 
JLZ was on notice at the time of entering into the Purchase 
And Sale Agreement and at the time of closing the purchase, of the 
ongoing IDEQ approved and PSTF financed remediation. JLZ was on 
notice of all reasonable information that a reasonable 
investigation at the time of purchase would have revealed. JLZ 
was kept reasonable informed and involved in the remediation by 
ALBAR and/or its contractors and insurer. 
JLZ seeks damages for it having to undertake remediation to 
get the property "cleared for development" which was not the 
contracted for bargain. JLZ bought a going concern, with an 
ongoing remediation. JLZ cannot recover for asserted damages that 
are beyond the contemplation of the parties to the contract. 
In addition, JLZ had a duty to mitigate damages (also known 
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as the doctrine of avoidable consequences) which will deny 
recovery for damages which could have been avoided or recovered by 
reasonable acts, including reasonable expenditures. 
The testimony of Echo VanderWal and her assertions and 
responses, lend little as to credibility for the positions she 
takes. Echo VanderWal showed by her testimony and the evidence 
admitted shows, that she has a propensity to react emotionally and 
with little rational, when faced with almost any matter regarding 
this property and environmental clean up. The evidence shows that 
she attempts to transfer all of her errors in decision and 
judgment as to the environmental status of the property, to ALBAR. 
Echo VanderWal does not appear to take or accept any responsible 
for the situations she placed herself in. 
The bottom line is that JLZ is claiming contractual 
obligations and duties that are not a part of the contract and 
closing documents and that are not a reasonable interpretation of 
paragraph 3 of the counter offer contained in the PSA. JLZ cannot 
recover damages beyond the contemplated scope of the parties. 
III. ALBAR WAS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS BEFORE THE 
DISTRICT COURT 
ALBAR, INC. and ELMER B. SUDAU sought an award of costs and 
attorney fees before the District Court in sums claimed pursuant 
to IRCP 54(d) and 54(e). ALBAR, INC., an Idaho corporation, and 
ELMER B. SUDAU are entitled to attorney fees pursuant to the Note 
and the Deed of Trust, the Real Estate Purchase And Sale 
Agreement, Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 12-121, Idaho Code § 6-402, 
and/or the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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The consolidated actions involved the defense of ALBAR, 
INC., an Idaho corporation, and ELMER B. SUDAU (CV-2007-1489), on 
numerous causes of action of fraud, breach of contract, mutual 
mistake, negligence, and involved the prosecution of a 
foreclosure action for ALBAR, INC. (CV-2007-1841), all involving 
JLZ ENTERPRISES, INC., and ECHO VANDERWAL. 
On the foreclosure claims (CV-2007-1489) the Defendant JLZ 
ENTERPRISES denied default and liability in its Answer (dated 
December 4, 2007); then denied direct Requests For Admission (see 
Notice of Filing filed September 9, 2008) as to default and 
liability; then opposed summary judgment (including partial) by 
affidavit and argument, and then on the eve of trial entered into 
the Stipulation To Admit as to default and liability. JLZ 
ENTERPRISES then during and after trial disputed interest as 
related to the foreclosure. 
On the claims of JLZ ENTERPRISES, all claims against SUDAU 
were dismissed with prejudice, as well as most claims against 
ALBAR, INC. In addition, the claim of rescission was withdrawn 
during trial and denied as a remedy. Although JLZ ENTERPRISES 
did prevail on a claim of breach of contract, said damages were 
based on a finding of ambiguity in the contract and a District 
Court imposed reasonable period for remediation. In addition, 
JLZ ENTERPRISES claimed damages in excess of $2,300,000 million 
before trial and as an offset in excess of $450,000 at trial. 
The actual amount awarded as an offset was significantly less, 
with a net foreclosure judgment in favor of ALBAR, INC. 
Taking into consideration the totality of the conduct of JLZ 
ENTERPRISES, the resolution of the various claims, the damage 
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claims by JLZ, and the resulting net judgment in favor of ALBAR, 
INC., results in an award to ALBAR, INC. and to AL SUDAU as the 
prevailing party (ies) is (are) as being appropriate and 
reasonable. 
IV. ALBAR IS ENTITLED TO RELIEF FROM THE OFFSET DAMAGES AWARDED 
FOR THE SUMS RECEIVED BY JLZ FROM IDEQ FOR REMEDIATION 
ALBAR sought relief from the offset damages awarded to JLZ 
following trial, based upon the reimbursement received by JLZ from 
the IDEQ. At the time of trial, JLZ and the Dock-N-Shop property 
were enrolled in a Voluntary Remediation program with Pilot 
Project reimbursement funds available for clean up costs. 
Following the trial, the District Court awarded JLZ offset damages 
against the sums due ALBAR for cleanup costs at the Dock-n-Shop 
property incurred by JLZ. 
A. The Offset Damages Awarded JLZ Against ALBAR 
Following trial and post trial proceedings, the Court entered 
a Judgment And Decree Of Sale on July 27, 2010, which awarded JLZ 
ENTERPRISES, INC. damages in the total sum of TWO HUNDRED TWENTY 
EIGHT THOUSAND FORTY FOUR AND 72/100 DOLLARS ($228,044.72) as an 
offset to the amounts owned ALBAR, INC. Those damages were in 
part described in the Court's announcement of decision on 
September 3, 2009 (Transcript Court Trial & Judge's Decision pages 
1091 through 1099). In addition, the damages were itemized in the 
Court's Order re: Plaintiff's Motion For Reconsideration, entered 
May 11, 2010. The offset damages awarded were calculated as 
follows: 
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a. Klatt Invoices (PI. Ex. 21) $ 6,916.00 
b. Glahe & Assoc Invoices (PI. Ex. 22) $ 9,965.00 
c. Rough Electric Invoices (PI. Ex. 24) $ 1,271.00 
d. Northwest Fence Invoices (PI. Ex. 28) $ 4,102.00 
e. Miscellaneous Invoices (PI. Ex. 29 & 30) $ 5,676.00 
f. Golder & Assoc Invoices (PI. Ex. 31) $ 67,570.00 
g. Golder & Assoc Invoices (PI. Ex. 45) $ 5,552.00 
h. Kootenai Excavators Invoice (PI. Ex. 44) $ 45,300.00 
i. Waste Management Invoices (PI. Ex. 32) $ 79,493.65 
j. Avista Invoices (PI. Ex. 25) $ 2,199.07 
Total Offset Damages ~228[044.72 
At the time of trial JLZ had entered into the State of Idaho, 
Department of Environmental Quality program for Voluntary 
Remediation, and for reimbursement of the remediation expenses in 
the Community Reinvestment Pilot Initiative Reimbursement program. 
JLZ had not completed the necessary monitoring to receive final 
release of the property and to qualify for reimbursement of 
expenses in the pilot program at the time of the trial and post-
trial proceedings. 
B. JLZ Obtained Clearance For The Property And Received 
Reimbursement From IDEQ 
If the damages awarded were appropriate, ALBAR is entitled to 
relief for the sums received by JLZ from the IDEQ. Following the 
entry of the Judgment And Decree Of Sale on July 27, 2010, ALBAR 
became aware that JLZ had completed the necessary monitoring to 
obtain DEQ clearance of the site in June, 2010 (Supplemental 
Exhibits "A" & "B") and that JLZ had applied for reimbursement 
through the pilot program of its clean up costs, coincidentally, 
on July 27, 2010 (Supplemental Exhibit "C"). 
On or about March 1, 2011, JLZ submitted is revised 
application for reimbursement through the IDEQ pilot program of 
its clean up costs in the sum of $326,634.79. (Supplemental 
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Exhibit "E") . 
On or about March 21, 2011, the IDEQ approved clean up costs 
in the sum of $217,950.31 as reimbursable remediation costs as set 
forth in a table created by the IDEQ (Supplemental Exhibit "G") as 
follows: 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
City of Priest River Expenses 
Excavation Expenses 
Northwest Fence Co. 
Waste Management 
Golder & Associates 
Prism Environmental (VanMiddlesworth) 
Total DEQ Approved 
$ 216.98 
$ 60,051. 82 
$ 1,230.66 
$ 83,732.54 
$ 66,243.21 
$ 6,475.10 
$217,950.31 
The total qualifying remediation costs were $217,950.31, with the 
program being capped at $150,000.00 for reimbursement. The IDEQ 
deducted from the available $150,000.00, the sum of $4,978.00 that 
the IDEQ had directly disbursed to obtain the last monitoring and 
reports necessary for the site clearance. (Supplemental Exhibits 
"F" & "G"). The net amount approved and received on March 29, 
2011 by JLZ from the IDEQ reimbursement program was $145,021.95. 
A comparison of the amounts awarded by the Court for offset 
damages and the amounts the IDEQ approved as qualifying for 
reimbursement shows that the common amounts are as follows: 
a. Fence Expenses: The Court awarded $4,102.00 and the 
IDEQ approved $1,230.66. The common figure is 
$1,230.66. 
b. Excavation Expenses: The Court awarded $45,300.00 and 
the IDEQ approved $60,051.82. The common figure is 
$45,300.00. 
c. Waste Management: The Court awarded $79,493.65 and the 
IDEQ approved $83,732.54. The common figure is 
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$79,493.65. 
d. Golder & Associations/VanMiddlesworth: The Court 
awarded $73,122.00 and the IDEQ approved $72,718.31. 
The common figure is $72,718.31. 
The Total Common is: $198,742.62 
The reimbursement received by JLZ (based upon the max~um 
allowed by the program) was $145,021.95, which is less than the 
common total of the Court's awarded offsets and the IDEQ approved 
reimbursement. It is undisputed that JLZ received the funds from 
the IDEQ for remediation reimbursement. 
ALBAR is entitled to relief from the judgment by reducing the 
offset damages awarded to JLZ for the sums received by JLZ from 
the IDEQ reimbursement program based on the duty to 
mitigate/doctrine of avoidable consequences, and the general rules 
of damages being to compensate in a breach of contract action. 
The appropriate relief for ALBAR is to reduce the offset damages 
awarded to JLZ by the actual sum it received in reimbursement from 
the DEQ of $145,021.95. 
C. ALBAR's Motion For Relief From Judgment Was T~ely And 
Appropriate 
ALBAR's motion for relief from judgment was made pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 60 (b) , which provides (emphasis added) as follows: 
(b) Mistakes, Inadvertence, Excusable Neglect, Newly 
Discovered Evidence, Fraud, Grounds for Relief From Judgment 
on Order. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due 
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for 
a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore 
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or 
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other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is 
void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or 
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has 
been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer 
equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from 
the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) 
not more than six (6) months after the judgment, order, or 
proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this 
subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment 
or suspend its operation. Such motion does not require leave 
from the Supreme Court, or the district court, as the case 
may be, as though the judgment has been affirmed or settled 
upon appeal to that court. This rule does not limit the 
power of a court to: (i) entertain an independent action to 
relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding, or 
(ii) to set aside, as provided by law, within one (1) year 
after judgment was entered, a judgment obtained against a 
party who was not personally served with summons and 
complaint either in the state of Idaho or in any other 
jurisdiction, and who has failed to appear in said action, 
or (iii) to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. 
Here the motion for relief included new evidence created 
after the actual trial proceedings in the case, and following the 
actual entry of the judgment in the case (which was upon appeal at 
the time). The actual completion of remediation and the 
application for and then receipt of reimbursement by JLZ happened 
subsequent to the District Court's decision. 
As set forth in Moffett v. Moffett, 253 P.3d 764, 770 (Idaho 
Ct. App. 2011) (citations omitted), "I.R.C.P. 60(b) authorizes 
the presentation of new evidence .. .. ff ALBAR is entitled, upon 
such terms as are just, to relief from the awarded offset damages 
to JLZ in the Judgment And Decree Of Sale, due to JLZ receiving 
final clean up and reimbursement from the DEQ, which would 
qualify under Rule 60(b) (2) as newly discovered evidence which by 
due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for 
a new trial under Rule 59(b); or under Rule 60 (b) (5) or it is no 
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
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application to the calculations of the amount due for the 
foreclosure sale upon the security; or 60(b) (6) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment, as the 
application of the duty to mitigate damages and the doctrine of 
avoidable consequences apply to the damages recoverable by JLZ as 
an offset. 
The motion by ALBAR was made within a reasonable time of 
learning that JLZ had received clearance from the DEQ and that 
JLZ had applied for reimbursement, and such motion was not more 
than six (6) months after the judgment was entered. The trial 
was completed in June, 2009, with the decision, reconsideration, 
and briefing resulting in the judgment being entered July 27, 
2010. JLZ completed final monitoring (based upon funding by 
IDEQ) and received clearance from DEQ in June 2010, and first 
applied for reimbursement from DEQ on July 27, 2010. JLZ 
submitted an amended application for reimbursement in March 2011 
and on March 29, 2011 the reimbursement funds were disbursed by 
the IDEQ to JLZ. ALBAR's motion was filed November 30, 2010 
while the application for reimbursement was still pending. 
The facts that subsequent to trial JLZ completed final 
monitoring, received clearance from the IDEQ for the property, 
applied for reimbursement from the IDEQ pursuant to the pilot 
rebate program, and received an actual rebate of $145,021.95 for 
much of the same sums ($198,742.62) as were awarded as offset 
damages ($228,044.72) against ALBAR for breach of contract, meets 
the requisite showings under IRCP 60(b). 
Under Rule 60(b) (2) the facts are newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to 
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move for a new trial under Rule 59(b). 
Under Rule 60(b) (5) the facts make it no longer equitable 
that the judgment should have prospective application to the same 
offset calculations against the amount due to ALBAR for the 
foreclosure sale upon the security. 
Under Rule 60(b) (6) the facts are any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment, as the 
application of the duty to mitigate damages and the doctrine of 
avoidable consequences apply to the damages recoverable by JLZ as 
an offset. 
D. The Duty To Mitigate, Also Known As The Doctrine Of 
Avoidable Consequences, Applies To The Reimbursement 
JLZ Received 
JLZ claimed and was awarded offset damages against ALBAR by 
the District Court for breach of contract measured as cleanup 
costs at the Dock-n-Shop property. JLZ at the time of the award 
of the offset damages was enrolled in a voluntary cleanup and a 
program for reimbursement, but asserted it could not afford to pay 
for the limited remaining monitoring to obtain the clearance and 
to obtain the reimbursement. 
Subsequent to trial and the District's Court decision, JLZ 
obtained a Certificate of Completion and a Covenant Not To Sue for 
the clean up of the property (Supplement Exhibits "A" & "B"). JLZ 
for and been approved for and has actually received $145,021.95 in 
reimbursement for clean up expenses (Supplemental Exhibits "C", 
"D", "E", "F", "G", "H", "I" & "J"). The reimbursement received 
includes significant sums which are the same as the sums awarded 
as offset damages in the action against ALBAR. 
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As set forth in Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 
253, 261 (1993), which involved an action for breach of a real 
estate contract, the Idaho Supreme Court recited that: 
The duty to mitigate, also known as the "doctrine of 
avoidable consequences," provides that a plaintiff who is 
injured by actionable conduct of a defendant is ordinarily 
denied recovery for damages which could have been avoided by 
reasonable acts, including reasonable expenditures, after 
actionable conduct has taken place. O'Nei~ v. Vasseur, 118 
Idaho 257, 796 P.2d 134 (Ct.App.1990); Davis v. First 
Interstate Bank ox Idaho, N.A., 115 Idaho 169, 765 P.2d 680 
(1988) . 
As set forth in O'Neil v. Vasseur, 118 Idaho 257, 262 (Idaho 
Ct. App. 1990), which involved a breach of contract action 
against attorneys in the handling of an action, which was 
subsequently resolved by the pro se client, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals has described and applied the doctrine, as follows: 
It is well established that the party entitled to the 
benefit of a contract has as a duty to use "reasonable 
exertion" to mitigate his damages. Wicker v. Hoppock, 73 
U.S. (6 Wall.) 94, 18 L.Ed. 752 (1878). Such a policy 
protects "persons against whom wrongs have been committed 
from passively suffering economic loss which could be 
averted by reasonable efforts." Industria~ Leasing Corp. v. 
Thomason, 96 Idaho 574, 577, 532 P.2d 916, 919 (1974); 
quoting Wright v. Baumann, 239 Or. 410, 398 P.2d 119 (1965). 
As explained in 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 28 Compensation as 
limit of recovery, "The law abhors duplicative recoveries; in 
other words, a plaintiff who is injured by reason of a 
defendant's behavior is, for the most part, entitled to be made 
whole, not to be enriched. The sole object of compensatory 
damages is to make the injured party whole for losses actually 
suffered; the plaintiff cannot be made more than whole, make a 
profit, or receive more than one recovery for the same harm. 
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Thus, a plaintiff in a civil action for damages cannot, in the 
absence of punitive or statutory treble damages, recover more 
than the loss actually suffered. The plaintiff is not entitled to 
a windfall, and the law will not put him in a better position 
than he would be in had the wrong not been done or the contract 
not been broken." 
At the time of trial in this matter, ALBAR asserted the duty 
to mitigate, also known as the doctrine of avoidable consequences, 
against JLZ for its own conduct of failing to complete the 
voluntary clean up plan and pilot re~ursement program in which 
it and the Dock-n-Shop property were enrolled with DEQ. If 
completed and re~ursement received, that would reduce the 
damages to JLZ for its claimed breach of contract by ALBAR. 
JLZ subsequently completed the clean up and was re~ursed. 
JLZ is not entitled to a duplicative recovery by offset damages 
against ALBAR and by reimbursement by the IDEQ for the same sums 
expended. JLZ is only entitled to be made whole by an award for 
breach of contract, not to be enriched or to receive a windfall, 
by the award. 
The sole object of compensatory damages is to make JLZ whole 
for losses actually suffered. JLZ cannot be made more than 
whole, make a profit, or receive more than one recovery for the 
same harm (the expenditures for cleanup). JLZ cannot recover 
more than the loss actually suffered and the law will not put JLZ 
in a better position than had there been no damages for breach of 
contract. The loss suffered is reduced by the reimbursement 
received by the IDEQ. 
If JLZ is allowed to receive offset damages and to actually 
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keep the reimbursement funds from the IDEQ, an abhorred 
duplicative recovery would result. To prevent such a situation, 
the offset damages awarded to JLZ against the sums due to ALBAR 
must be reduced. 
E. The Collateral Source Rule Is Inapplicable In Regards 
To Breach Of Contract Damages 
JLZ asserted that the Collateral Source Rule prevents ALBAR 
from having the offset damages reduced by the reimbursement 
received from the IDEQ as a collateral source. At common law, 
the collateral source rule or doctrine is as described in 
Westfall v. Caterpillar, Inc., 120 Idaho 918, 924, 821 P.2d 973, 
979 (1991), as follows: 
As this Court stated in Brinkman v. Aid Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 
346, 766 P.2d 1227 (1988): 
Generally, the collateral source doctrine is as 
follows: 
Where a plaintiff is compensated for his injuries by 
some source independent of the tortfeasor-insurance, 
for example-the general rule is that the plaintiff is 
still permitted to make a full recovery against the 
tortfeasor himself, even though this gives the 
plaintiff a double recovery or even a recovery for 
losses he never had at all. 
Brinkman, 115 Idaho at 352, 766 P.2d at 1233, quoting 
wi th approval from D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 8.10, 
pp. 581-82 (1973). 
As set forth in Daryl Tuttle v. Wayment Farms, Inc., Sudenga 
Indus., Inc., an Iowa cOrporation, 22213, 1997 WL 327356 (Idaho 
Ct. App. June 17, 1997) aff'd sub nom. Tuttle v. Wayment Farms, 
Inc., 131 Idaho 105, 952 P.2d 1241 (1998), "A collateral source 
is defined as compensation from a source wholly independent of 
the tortfeasor, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 262 (6th ed.1990) , for 
example, sickness or health insurance or worker's compensation 
insurance payments." 
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In 1990, the legislature adopted Idaho Code § 6-1606. 
Prohibiting double recoveries from collateral sources, which 
provides as follows: 
In any action for personal injury or property damage, a 
judgment may be entered for the claimant only for damages 
which exceed amounts received by the claimant from 
collateral sources as compensation for the personal injury 
or property damage, whether from private, group or 
governmental sources, and whether contributory or 
noncontributory. For the purposes of this section, 
collateral sources shall not include benefits paid under 
federal programs which by law must seek subrogation, death 
benefits paid under life insurance contracts, benefits paid 
by a service corporation organized under chapter 34, title 
41, Idaho Code, and benefits paid which are recoverable 
under subrogation rights created under Idaho law or by 
contract. Evidence of payment by collateral sources is 
admissible to the court after the finder of fact has 
rendered an award. Such award shall be reduced by the court 
to the extent the award includes compensation for damages 
which have been compensated independently from collateral 
sources. S.L. 1990, ch. 131, § 1. 
The collateral source rule at common law does not apply to 
this breach of contract action. The statutory provisions of Idaho 
Code § 6-1606 adopted in 1990 do not apply to this breach of 
contract action. In Idaho, by common law and statutory provision, 
the collateral source rule applies only to tort claims and 
recovery from tortfeasors for personal injury or property damage. 
22 Am Jur. 2d. Damages § 392 Generally provides that the 
collateral source rule applies in the circumstances of tort 
recoveries, because the basis of a recovery in a tort case is not 
just for compensation. In a breach of contract action the sole 
basis of recovery is compensation. 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 394. 
Applicability in breach-of-contract cases provides that "[t]he 
case for the application of the collateral-source rule is less 
compelling in breach-of-contract cases than in the case of a 
tort. The reason is that no one should profit more from the 
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breach of an obligation than he or she would if the cont::riCllL·c::::::t were 
fully performed. Thus, the rule is held inapplicable to ~~~ach-
of-contract recoveries." 
In this action JLZ was awarded compensatory damages £,o:r 
breach of contract against ALBAR as an offset to the amo''!U:r.::L t due 
ALBAR. This is strictly a breach of contact award, and a..a such 
the collateral source rule is inapplicable. 
F. ~bar Is Entitled To Relief From The Judgment S~ 
Reducing The Offset Damages By The Sum Of Reimb"'l.1..::rsement 
Received By JLZ 
ALBAR is entitled to relief from the amount of offse~ clamages 
awarded to JLZ in the Judgment And Decree Of Sale entered ,~~ly 27, 
2010. The completion and reimbursement to JLZ is newly 
discovered evidence created after trial and the entry of 
judgment. The reimbursement makes it no longer equitablE: that 
the amount of net judgment in favor of ALBAR, INC. for 
foreclosure should be reduced to extent prior to reimbur,s~ent. 
The reimbursement also justifies relief from the operati~Z1 of the 
original calculation of offset damages in the judgment. 
only entitled to a single recovery for compensatory damag~~ £or 
breach of contract. JLZ received the sum of $145,021.95 1:~c>n the 
IDEQ pilot program to reimburse it for clean up expendi tu X".E!!:oS . 
Those same expenditures were the basis for the award of DX"E!!a.ch of 
contract damages. The net sum of damages after reimburse:DIL,E!!:lrl. t is 
the only property calculation pursuant to the Court's fi~'~~lrl.9S and 
conclusions. 
~ternatively, if the offset damages awarded against ,~BAR 
are not reduced by the reimbursement received, ALBAR wouLd :be 
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subrogated to the funds reimbursed and/or would be entitled to 
equitable reimbursement from the funds received by JLZ from the 
IDEQ. The Court should reduce the offset damages awarded in this 
action for the sake of judicial economy, rather that have ALBAR 
commence a separate action for subrogation and equitable 
reimbursement. 
As set forth above, ALBAR is entitled to the relief sought, 
specifically a reduction of the offset damages by the sum received 
by JLZ from the IDEQ. 
V. ALBAR IS ENTITELD TO ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL 
ALBAR seeks an award of costs and attorney fees upon appeal 
pursuant to IAR 40 & 41 District Court. ALBAR is entitled to 
attorney fees pursuant to the Note and the Deed of Trust, the 
Real Estate Purchase And Sale Agreement, Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 
12-121, and/or the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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CONCLUSION 
Albar is entitled to the relief requested above with the 
District Court's findings and conclusions of a breach of contract 
being reversed. If a breach is found, the damages awarded by the 
District Court should be reversed. If the damages are upheld, 
Albar should receive relief from the damages awarded, for the sums 
received for reimbursement to JLZ from the IDEQ for remediation. 
Lastly, Albar should be awarded its attorney fees and costs, 
before the District Court and upon appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this of April, 2012. 
INNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
Attorney for Appellant ALBAR 
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